# WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files

OA/Box:

Box 2

File Folder: Domenici/Whitehead Meeting 04/21/1988

Archivist: kdb

FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen

Date: 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1- memeon (3579)	re 4/21/88 conversation between Chief of Staff, Sen. Domenici, and Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead, 2p	4/21/88	Bl
-2. attachment	R 5/24/11 F97-06/6/6/45  From PVD, 1p  R 11 #6	4/20/88	B1

## RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
  B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].

  B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files

OA/Box: Box 2 Archivist: kdb

FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen

File Folder: Domenici/Whitehead Meeting 04/21/1988

Date: 08/04/2004

4/21/88	B1
4/20/88	B1
	., _ 1, 00

#### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN TUCK

FROM:

PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation of the Chief of Staff

with Senator Domenici and Deputy Secretary

Whitehead of April 21, 1988

Jim Kelly was the fourth attendee at subject meeting. His Memorandum of Conversation is at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A MEMCON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 21, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Chief of Staff, Senator Pete Domenici, and Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead

on 21 April 1988, 10:45-11:10 a.m.

Senator Domenici had requested the meeting. He presented a broad-based concept of a program in which the United States would lead an international effort to provide economic assistance and, in particular, entrepreneurial leadership as incentives to third world countries, with the Philippines as a model situation. It was apparent that Senator Domenici had considerable personal interest in this program.

Senator Domenici began by pointing out that he believed the historic accomplishment of America was to provide the incentive of a well-oiled economic machine for other countries to use. By doing so, they have unlocked enormous benefits for themselves. Accordingly, he felt that a program would be appropriate that could be dedicated for the use of budding and failing democracies. A good beginning country would be the Philippines. The Senator referred to meetings on the Philippines that Secretary Shultz had recently held with seven members of Congress. Senator Domenici stressed that his suggestion was not the same as the "Mini-Marshall Plan." He said his plan should be called a Shultz Plan or a Reagan Plan. He pointed out that the plan outlined at the Shultz meeting was a "monstrous program." Senator Baker remarked that this must have been what Lee Kuan Yew was referring to when he indicated in conversation that Singapore was interested in participating, but perhaps not at the Department of State's suggested levels.

Senator Domenici mentioned the importance of carrying this out with a Congressional Board of Directors. He stressed the importance of keeping this effort bipartisan and he distinguished it from previous efforts in third world development, which lacked the entrepreneurial concept which he considered to be vital.

Senator Domenici continued that he felt there was a particular opportunity for President Reagan to introduce the plan before he leaves the White House. He suggested there be a US/German/Japanese summit called together on a preplanned basis. This summit would identify, publicize and jointly launch this Reagan Plan, whose first beneficiary would be the Republic of the Philippines. The Senator then presented a paper, which is attached at Tab A.

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

MER F97-066/6#5

BY RW 5/24/1/

Secretary Whitehead then reviewed the program that he and Secretary Shultz had introduced to Members of Congress. It would be a major development program for the Republic of the Philippines, a \$10 billion program. One billion would be from government and one billion would be from the private sector for each of five successive years. He spelled out a breakdown of \$300 million from the U.S. (above existing levels), \$300 million from Japan, \$200 million from other European countries, and \$200 million from other Pacific Asian countries as the governmental shares. In response to Senator Baker's question, he gave an upbeat prognosis for President Aquino.

Senator Baker expressed pleasure that the Senator's proposal and the State Department's proposal were in reasonable conjunction. He noted that Secretary Shultz had not yet discussed his plans with the President, and suggested that the next step would be a presentation to President Reagan. In considering alternative means of presenting a plan to other foreign leaders, it was suggested that the Economic Summit might be the best place. Senator Baker indicated the need to work up something, possibly a Presidential speech, in advance of the Economic Summit, or whichever forum would introduce this idea.

Senator Domenici said, as evidence of bipartisanship, that despite three meetings with Members of Congress, none had found it necessary to talk to reporters about the plan. The Senator also said that he had discussed the idea with the Vice President, who seemed "thrilled."

Secretary Whitehead outlined the need for ground work within the Administration, and mentioned the need to appoint some individual to play a key role in working the plan with other countries. Senator Dan Evans and former Ambassador Sol Linowitz were names that were mentioned as possible leaders.

In concluding the meeting, Senator Baker indicated that he believed that this was a great idea, and that the next move was to look for a signal from the Department of State in terms of a briefing of the President some two to three weeks off. He noted it would be useful if President Reagan worked this initiative to keep it bipartisan and out of the campaign. Senator Baker felt the plan was something that the President might respond to very favorably.

The meeting concluded.

Prepared by: James A. Kelly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE SECOND PHASE

As the Administration enters its final months, one of our most noble accomplishments abroad -- the trend toward democracy-- is at risk. From Latin America to the Philippines, most emerging democracies are strangled by a common failure to move beyond free elections to strong economies.

In the past the United States, by itself, could revive a major foreign economy that was determined to succeed. We proved that in Western Europe and East Asia after World War II. Today, those that we helped then are capable and ready to help other fragile democracies as we helped them forty years ago.

Two elements are needed to revive the success of the Marshall Plan in selected target countries: American leadership of a common Free World effort; and determination by leaders of the new democracies to promote equitable growth based on private sector entrepreneurs.

The amount of aid and debt relief provided to a new democracy is not the critical issue. The quality and flexibility of the common aid and the determination of the country helped is critical. Our limited success in Central America proves this.

While a multiyear multibillion dollar commitment to an individual democracy by the U.S., Japan, and Germany, for example, is necessary, it is not sufficient. The aid, debt relief, and investment would not be entitlements. They would be contingent on cooperation by those we are trying to help.

To do this effectively, designation of a single individual to oversee the common effort is essential. That person, not necessarily an American, would: a) work with the government and private sector of the receiving nation, b) report back to the leadership of the donor countries, and c) be committed to an effort to help entrepreneur-led growth that would bear little resemblance to traditional foreign aid.

There are ample signs that our people would welcome a limited, clearly focused effort to help these new democracies. The burden would have to be shared, particularly by Japan and Germany. All that is required is a clear focus, an emerging democracy viewed with sympathy by the people of all three major Free World mature democracies.

A summit invitation later this year by President Reagan to the Prime Minister of Japan and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of German could result in rapid implementation of this initiative. The beleaguered Philippine people are an obvious initial target, if the Government and private sector clearly commit themselves to doing their utmost to succeed.

F97-06666#6 8VRW 5/24/11

PVD/4-20-88